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Abstract
The traditional methodology examining optimal boards relates a simple board
variable (e.g., independence or board demography) to firm performance, however, ig-
noring other board characteristics. This paper investigates how the education and
business experience of directors affect firm performance. The sample consists of
1,574 directorships from 224 listed firms in Switzerland. Using OLS and including
control variables, the results show that graduates of minor Swiss universities are
negatively related to Tobin’s Q, and industrial knowledge and Tobin’s Q are nega-
tively correlated if the firm has more divisions. In addition, director fixed effects
(or unobserved characteristics) are significant, but improve the explanatory power
of the models only by 5 percent.
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The board of directors assumes an important task in modern corporations. The pri-
mary responsibility of the board is to monitor the management on the shareholders’
behalf. In addition, the board advises the management and has decision power. This
power includes setting the firm’s strategy and executive compensation, appointing the
top management and nominating new directors. Since the board of directors is vested
with the responsibility of ensuring that the shareholders’ money is not wasted, share-
holders ought to have a serious interest in ensuring that the board is staffed with well
educated and experienced directors.
Accordingly, surveys conducted by consultancy firms frequently mention "hard" and
"soft" personal profile factors of directors to be important for board efficiency. Such fac-
tors include experience, know-how, and education, but also integrity, leadership or credi-
bility (KPMG, 2001). Similar reports posit the importance of expertise such as financial,
industrial or international experience (Spencer Stuart, 2010).
Firms themselves, or their boards, precisely specify the profile requirements they
expect of their directors. For instance, Airesis, a sporting brands holding, explicitly states
in their 2008 annual report that the board must consist of at least one member with
board experience in listed corporations, one member with a legal background, and one
member with financial knowledge. Additionally, they should bring such skills to the
board that facilitate interactive decision-making.
Last but not least, regulations influence the composition of boards, as well. For in-
stance, the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 proposes every board to create an
independent audit committee composed of financial experts (Linck et al., 2009).1
Furthermore, today’s boards are subject more than ever to duties of diligence owing
to the increasing threat of litigation. Legal compliance issues require modern board
members to possess the requisite legal expertise.
In contrast to rather journalistic surveys, academic studies very rarely tackle direc-
tor characteristics from the viewpoint of specialist knowledge (see Adams et al., 2010).
Directors are typically divided into groups according to their independence from the
firm. Usually, academic research identifies executive directors as being insiders and
non-management directors as being outsiders. However, this ignores the fact that the
two groups of directors may require different skills in order to execute their duties ad-
equately. For instance, Fama and Jensen (1983) underline the importance of outside
directors with specific expertise (e.g., in finance, corporate law or industrial technology).
Hence, outsiders do not all have one and the same purpose on the board.
1See Section 301(m)(3)(A): "In general — Each member of the audit committee of the issuer shall be
a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be independent". And SOX Section
407(a): "Rules Defining ’Financial Expert’. The Commission shall issue rules, as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors, to require each issuer, together with
periodic reports required pursuant to sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to
disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of
at least 1 member who is a financial expert, as such term is defined by the Commission."
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More recent studies examine the impact of board demography (or board diversity) on
firm performance or behavior, and there are also studies specifically addressing gender
or ethnicity issues; yet, all are silent about the real value of the personal expertise that
directors bring to the board. The question of personal profile needs to be addressed, be-
cause the performance benefits from career specifics are not directly correlated with de-
mographics (i.e., females or foreigners). As an illustration, the management researchers
Hillman et al. (2002) show that "community influentials" are more likely to be females
or African-American.2 Similarly, sociologists Zeng and Xie (2004) find evidence that
U.S. employees educated abroad earn less than Americans or foreigners educated in the
United States.
These two examples demonstrate that the omission of certain attributes, such as
skill and experience, causes problems when assessing the aptitude of various profiles for
specific posts. Specifically, ethnicity and gender may affect firm performance indirectly
via other associated characteristics. Factors such as place of education (i.e., domestic
or abroad) and experience (i.e., "community influentials" or "business experts") may be
more relevant than demographic attributes in explaining firm performance. Hence, if
such issues are omitted, the results of empirical investigations may lead to false inter-
pretations, because more important features are left out. In terms of econometric quality,
omitted factors are completely absorbed in the error term leading to endogeneity prob-
lems if one does not describe directors more precisely.
Numerous research results have been published on board structures since the 1970s.
These studies examine the determinants of board structure, the firm behavior affected by
board structure, and lastly the influence of the board on firm performance. Nevertheless,
there is no conclusive evidence determining what constitutes an optimal board compo-
sition. One reason might be that board composition has been examined using broad
classifications such as board independence or demography. However, features relating
to skills may be more important in studying board effectiveness. Unfortunately, studies
examining the effect of education or business experience on firm performance are rare.
An explanation of why the personal characteristics of directors are mostly ignored
may be due to the absence of theoretical foundations for explaining the impact that par-
ticular directors have on firm performance or company behavior. As an example, in
contrast to independent non-executive directors, it is difficult to develop a rationale pro-
moting more university graduates on boards. Additionally, empirical studies do not often
address director skills, because detailed data of these characteristics is not readily avail-
2In an earlier study, Hillman et al. (2000) classify board members skill-wise into three categories with
specific board roles. The first group, "business experts" have executive experience as CEOs or as officers
of large corporations. The second group, "support specialists" provide particular services to the boards;
e.g., legal advice or financial expertise. And the final category includes politicians and university profes-
sors. This group has no specialized business background, but influences society and opinion-making. Such
directors are denominated "community influentials" (Baysinger and Butler (1985) apply similar classifica-
tions).
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able. Personal factors (e.g., talent) are either not observable or difficult to proxy.
This paper contributes to the literature in one important way. The study sheds light
on how education (e.g., university graduates) and the professional background (e.g., in-
dustrial knowledge) of directors are related to firm performance in Swiss firms. Educa-
tion and professional experience are often mentioned by surveys and consultancy firms,
but rarely investigated by academic papers. We employ 17 variables to describe the ed-
ucational background and 4 variables defining professional experience. Data was hand-
collected from 224 annual reports in 2008 which comprise 1,574 directors. Furthermore,
we use fixed effects to examine whether the unobserved heterogeneity of directors is an
important factor in explaining firm performance.
1 Literature Review
The quasi non-existence of empirical studies on the education and business experience
of board members leaves us with a narrow literature review. Our review is restricted to
studies that address directors with financial expertise, especially bankers. To our knowl-
edge, no previous study investigates the relationship between education and business
experience (except for financial know-how), and firm performance. Financial know-how
is one of many variables applied in this paper. Moreover, ever since the introduction of
SOX, financially literate directors are legally requested on audit committees, and some
countries historically have had an important banking-influence in their corporate gov-
ernance (see La Porta et al., 1998). To illustrate the issue, commercial bankers repre-
senting banking interests are encountered more frequently in Germany or Japan than
in the United States, especially in large and stable firms (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001).
In 1995, German financial institutions held 19 percent of all directorships (Schroder and
Schrader, 1997).
Several empirical studies investigated the impact of directors with financial know-
how on firm policy and on stock prices. Bankers seem to affect firm policy, e.g., they
increase external funding if the firm has poor forecasts, but good credit ratings or tend
to decrease the debt ratio if the director is from a lending bank (see Güner et al., 2008;
Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005). Bankers are also more likely to be present on specific boards.
Ramirez (1995) demonstrates that firms associated with J.P. Morgan in the United States
are financially less constrained. Such associations usually implied that someone from
J.P. Morgan would assume a seat on the board and thus monitor its client. Jeanjean and
Stolowy (2009) indicate that the board and ownership structure is related to the propor-
tion of bankers on French boards. Finally, Dittmann et al. (2010) show that bankers are
negatively related to firm value in non-financial corporations in Germany. Furthermore,
they detect that bankers do not perform a monitoring role neither in their own inter-
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est as debtholders nor as shareholders. Also, bankers do not seem to provide financial
expertise for firms in financial distress. In contrast, they find evidence that bankers pro-
mote financial services and increase borrowing. These directors also seek appointments
to larger boards that facilitate networking.
In brief, the benefits of financial expertise on a board is related to the intentions of
the appointed directors. They might face conflicts of interests in their board capacity,
especially where equity stakes and debt are concerned. For instance, stock prices react
positively if an independent director with financial expertise is appointed to an audit
committee of a firm with strong corporate governance (DeFond et al., 2005). Thus, the
firm’s environment is important in addressing the effect of professional expertise or ed-
ucation on firm performance.
2 Data Description and Definition of Variables
One of the reasons why most empirical studies on the composition of the board of direc-
tors are restricted to simple board characteristics is data availability. Collecting more
detailed information on directors is time consuming. In this study, information on 1,574
directorships from 224 annual reports in 2008 is hand-collected for all firms listed at
the Swiss stock exchange. This is six years after the Swiss Code of Best Practice for
Corporate Governance (Economiesuisse, 2008) and the Directive on Information relat-
ing to Corporate Governance (SIX Exchange, 2008) were introduced. These standards
led to improved information disclosure about each director in the annual report (e.g.,
curriculum vitae). This advance enabled us to obtain the detailed data required for our
study.
2.1 Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q
Firm performance is measured using Tobin’s Q (Q). Q is calculated as the ratio of the
market value of equity plus book value of total debt to the book value of total assets.
The study uses all classes of equity, including non-listed equity. The equity price is the
mean value calculated on the basis of a 30-trading day window around the last trading
day in 2007 multiplied by the number of the respective securities.3 The market value
of non-listed equity of listed companies is derived from the mean stock prices adjusted
to the nominal value. The market value, based on the stock prices, can be seen as the
risk-adjusted present value of all future cash flows. The gap between the market value
and the book value can consist of intangible assets which, among other factors, may also
mirror the ability of the board of directors.
3The unadjusted price (UP) in Thomson Reuters Datastream.
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2.2 Education Variables
The first group of director characteristics is related to its educational background. Our
assessment of educational background is limited to higher education, because this is
what usually is disclosed in annual reports. First of all, the academic degree is assessed:
a professorial status is denoted PR, a doctoral degree (Ph.D.) is denoted DR, a master
of business administration degree or equivalent is denoted MBA, a university degree is
denoted UNI, and another higher education degree is denoted FH (0 is the reference
group for no higher education).4 Each variable measures the fraction of directors on the
board with a specific feature.
Furthermore, university graduates are split into four major fields of study: business
and economics (ECO), law (LAW), natural sciences (NAT), and technical sciences (TEC)
(0 is another field of studies or none).
Finally, the provenance of the degree is considered. The alma mater of the direc-
tors is collected for six major Universities in Switzerland: the University of Basel (BS),
the University of Berne (BE), the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETH), the
University of Geneva (GE), the University of St. Gallen (SG)5, and the University of
Zurich (ZH) are included. Moreover, education at another Swiss university, which com-
paratively few directors attended, is denoted OTHU6 and a foreign university is denoted
FOU (0 is for no university degree or not defined).
2.3 Business Experience Variables
The second group of variables reflects business experience. International experience is
denoted INTL for directors who worked abroad as reported in their résumé or who are
foreigners.7 CEOEX indicates directors with experience as CEOs. Other executive activ-
ities have been excluded because most directors hold or have held management positions
during their career. Financial know-how (FKN) is allocated to business or economics
graduates (FH and UNI), to bankers, accountants, controllers or chartered accountants,
and to graduates of business schools (MBA). INDKN denotes industry know-how, proxied
by directors who have conducted research in the area or who are working or have been
working in the same industry sector.
4FH includes the University of Applied Sciences ("Fachhochschule") or equivalent.
5Formerly known as Hochschule St. Gallen (HSG)
6These are the universities of Fribourg, Lausanne, Luzern, Neuchâtel, Svizzera italiana in Lugano, and
the EPFL in Lausanne (the equivalent of the ETH in Zurich).
7Citizens from Liechtenstein (LIE) are not considered as foreigners. The 15 directors from Liechtenstein
belong mainly to the Vaduz-based Liechtensteinische Landesbank (7) and VP Bank (5). Dual citizens have
been categorized separately according to their life career (e.g., childhood).
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2.4 Control Variables
The firm-specific know-how of directors is measured by the fraction of executive directors
on the board (EXEC) and board tenure (BTEN) which is the average tenure of the board
members.
The firm’s operational environment is proxied by firm size, its financial situation, the
number of business and geographical segments, and the industry affiliation. Firm size
is measured by the natural logarithm of annual net sales and denoted ln(SALES). The
financial situation is proxied by NDIV and is 1 if the firm did not pay out dividends in
2007 (and 0 otherwise). Financially constrained firms often rely on financial experts.
DIVISIONS is the number of business segments and REGIONS is the number of
geographical segments where the corporation has significant business activities differing
from other segments.
Moreover, industry fixed effects (INDUSTRY) are crucial in studies on corporate gov-
ernance since industries differ in the qualification requirements they seek (see Table I).
Our respective definition is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) which
uses 2-digit or super-sector definitions.
Table I: This table presents the distribution of education and business experience in the 6 most important
industries in the sample. ICB-Code is the Industry Classification Benchmark code, Obs. is the number
of observations. The distribution of education and business experience is measured by the fraction of the
board’s industrial average. ECO is business and economics, LAW is law, NAT is natural science, and
TEC is technical science. INTL is international experience, CEOEX is CEO experience, FKN is financial
know-how, and INDKN is industrial know-how.
ICB-Code Definition Obs. ECO LAW NAT TEC
13 Chemicals 10 0.2845 0.1616 0.1682 0.1892
27 Industrial Goods & Services 49 0.2636 0.1825 0.0760 0.2760
37 Personal & Household Goods 12 0.1944 0.1050 0.0536 0.2230
45 Health Care 22 0.2607 0.1292 0.3792 0.1018
83 Banks 24 0.3166 0.2682 0.0346 0.0639
95 Technology 18 0.2802 0.1724 0.0866 0.1942
Total sample average 197 0.2858 0.1924 0.1029 0.1642
ICB-Code Definition Obs. INTL CEOEX FKN INDKN
13 Chemicals 10 0.5909 0.4592 0.5234 0.6625
27 Industrial Goods & Services 49 0.5086 0.5126 0.5899 0.5879
37 Personal & Household Goods 12 0.4690 0.5145 0.4724 0.6085
45 Health Care 22 0.6066 0.4400 0.5107 0.7378
83 Banks 24 0.2359 0.4448 0.6523 0.2886
95 Technology 18 0.6649 0.4571 0.5488 0.6511
Total sample average 197 0.4751 0.4939 0.5799 0.5562
Table I shows that firms partly compose their boards according to the industry they
are in. Health care firms tend to have more natural scientists, whereas in the bank-
ing industry there are more economists and lawyers on the board. In contrast, business
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experience does not present such a strong pattern. The low level of average interna-
tional and industrial experience in the banking industry is most probably attributable
to the cantonal banks that primarily operate in Switzerland and whose boards are to
some extent politically influenced. However, financial expertise is more evident in the
banking industry. Interestingly, the health care industry again shows a high proportion
of directors with industrial knowledge.
2.5 Summary Statistics
Table II shows that 74.8 percent of all directors have a university degree (UNI), 28.6
percent are graduates of business and economics studies (ECO), and another 19.2 per-
cent studied law (LAW) (see Figure 1). In what concerns the provenance of the degrees,
14.4 percent are graduates of the ETH Zurich (ETH), 9.4 percent of the University of St.
Gallen (SG), and 9.2 percent of the University of Zurich (ZH). Besides, 19.7 percent are
graduates of foreign universities (FOU).
Figure 1: Education of Directors.
Relating to business experience (see Figure 2), on average, 58 percent of the board
members have financial expertise (FKN), 56 percent have industrial know-how (IN-
DKN), approximately 50 percent of the directors have experience as CEOs (CEOEX),
and 48 percent are internationally experienced (INTL).8 Hence, more than half of all
board members exhibit financial know-how. In comparison, the sample of Linck et al.
8Please note that commercial bankers do not play an important role on Swiss boards. This is the reason
why this characteristic has been excluded. Directors who can be identified as being commercial bankers on
the board of directors on behalf of a credit-lending bank are not identifiable. A possible candidate is Peter
Kappeler, chairman of "Berner Kantonalbank" and director of "Jungfraubahnen" in which the bank has a
10-percent ownership stake. In addition, Mr. Kappeler has business relations with "Jungfraubahnen".
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(2009) reveals a total of 22 percent for lawyers/consultants (8.91 percent) and financial
experts (12.93 percent) on U.S. boards in 2004.
Figure 2: Business Experience of Directors.
2.6 Boards in Switzerland
The data give evidence that the firm’s industrial affiliation affects the composition of the
board (see Table I). Furthermore, we subsequently describe some cases of particularly
homogeneous boards. Technology-based corporations have a high amount of graduates
from ETH Zurich.9 Firms located near the University of St. Gallen have boards com-
posed by more than half of Ex-HSG students.10 The same applies for firms in the Basel
area or in Lausanne.11
Similarly, some boards are composed of graduates of the same field of study. Directors
holding law degrees make up half or more of a number of boards including several finan-
cial firms.12 Another interesting case is the board of "Pargesa", an investment company
based in Geneva. Its board comprises four members out of 18 who were educated at the
9"Bachem", "Komax", "Lem", "Schaffner", "Starrack Heckert", and "Uster Technologies" (all 60 percent);
"Canon", "Schweiter", and "Quadrant" (all 67 percent); and "Comet" and "Newave" 75 and 80 percent,
respectively.
10"Hügli" (71 percent), "St. Galler Kantonalbank" (71 percent), "Helvetia" (67 percent), "Bank CA St.
Gallen" (63 percent), and "BFW Liegeschaften" (50 percent).
11"Sarasin", "National Suisse", and "Basellandschaftliche Kantonalbank" have 57 percent, 57 percent,
and 73 percent graduates from the University of Basel, respectively. The board of "LO Holding" consists
of five members who have all studied in Lausanne (University of Lausanne and EPFL).
12"Baloise", "Bellevue Group", "Lindt & Sprüngli", "Perrot Duval", "SGS", "Swissquote", "Vaudoise
Assurances", "Victoria-Jungfrau" (all 50 percent); "Bank Sarasin", "Orell Füssli", "Sopracenerina",
"Flughafen Zurich" (all around 60 percent); "Warteck Invest" (67 percent), "Nationale Suisse" (71 percent),
and "Allreal" (80 percent).
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Table II: Summary statistics of the variables. The sample consists of 197 observations. The table presents
mean, median, minimum (Min), and maximum (Max) values as well as standard deviation (S.D.) for each
variable. The variables indicate the number of directors with a specific attribution divided by the number
of board members. Univ. denotes university and dir. is director.
Variable Definition Mean Median Min Max S.D.
Performance Variable
Q Tobin’s Q 1.809 1.340 0.641 8.481 1.177
Education: Academic Degree
PR Fraction of dir. with professorial status 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.107
DR Fraction of dir. with doctoral degrees 0.332 0.300 0.000 1.000 0.234
MBA Fraction of dir. with MBA degrees 0.142 0.111 0.000 0.600 0.154
UNI Fraction of dir. with university degrees 0.748 0.800 0.000 1.000 0.221
FH Fraction of dir. with other higher education 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.122
Education: Field of Study
ECO Fraction of business and economics graduates 0.286 0.250 0.000 1.000 0.211
LAW Fraction of law graduates 0.192 0.182 0.000 0.714 0.156
NAT Fraction of natural sciences graduates 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.857 0.170
TEC Fraction of technical sciences graduates 0.164 0.143 0.000 0.800 0.176
Education: Place of Education
BS Fraction of Univ. Basel graduates 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.727 0.120
BE Fraction of Univ. Berne graduates 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.071
ETH Fraction of ETH graduates 0.144 0.100 0.000 0.800 0.187
GE Fraction of Univ. Geneva graduates 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.070
SG Fraction of Univ. St. Gallen graduates 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.714 0.136
ZH Fraction of Univ. Zurich graduates 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.135
OTHU Fraction of other Swiss Univ. graduates 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.750 0.127
FOU Fraction of international Univ. graduates 0.197 0.143 0.000 1.000 0.230
Business Experience
INTL Fraction of internationally experienced dir. 0.475 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.301
CEOEX Fraction of dir. with experience as CEOs 0.494 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.217
FKN Fraction of dir. with financial know-how 0.580 0.600 0.000 1.000 0.237
INDKN Fraction of dir. with industrial know-how 0.556 0.571 0.000 1.000 0.265
Control Variables
EXEC Fraction of insiders 0.114 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.167
BTEN Average board tenure (in years) 7.711 6.889 1.500 25.000 3.935
NDIV 1 if no dividends paid in 2007 0.223 – – – –
SALES Net annual sales (in CHF million) 4,416 458 0 109,100 13,673
DIVISIONS Number of divisions 2.340 2.000 1.000 10.000 1.329
REGIONS Number of regions 3.274 3.000 1.000 10.000 1.719
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Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), an elite civil servant graduate school in France.
In many countries, business is in the hands of a homogeneous upper class like in the
Netherlands and Sweden or of families like in Asia (Non and Franses, 2007; Claessens
et al., 2000). This is partly also the case in Switzerland. However, over 87 percent of
all directors sit only on one board in comparison to 83 percent in the United States and
9 percent sit on two boards in contrast to 13 percent in the United States (RiskMetrics
Groups, 2008). Table III Panel A reports that the 1,574 directorships are shared by
1,349 directors. This means that every director has 1.167 directorships on average in
a company of the sample (excluding the directorships in non-listed firms). The director
categories that accumulated above-average directorships of the seats (i.e., > 1.167) are
professors (1.211), directors holding a Ph.D. (1.239), directors holding an MBA (1.203),
and university graduates in general (1.179). Law, technical sciences or business and
economics graduates occupy an above-average share of the seats, as well (1.258, 1.189,
and 1.181, respectively). Furthermore, all the directors from the universities listed in our
survey hold more seats ranging from 1.250 (GE) to 1.429 (ZH). Also directors with CEO
experience and financial know-how have 1.206 and 1.182 seats on average. In contrast,
directors educated at foreign universities and directors with international experience
(1.061 and 1.125) show below-average representation.
3 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis is divided into five parts. First, a univariate ordinary least
squares (OLS) analysis is conducted relating one explanatory variable to the response
variable. Next, the second analysis uses multivariate models that include several con-
trol variables. A third set of analyses examines relationships between education indices
and Tobin’s Q. The first three sets of models use data from 197 firm observations (224
excluding 27 investment companies). The fourth and fifth sets of analysis investigate
the relationships at the level of individual directors and use director fixed effects with a
data sample of 1,574 observations.
3.1 Univariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Analysis
Table IV, Column I, presents the univariate results of all variables of interest that re-
veal a significant relationship to Tobin’s Q. Out of the 17 proxies included to account
for education, 7 variables (MBA, ECO, LAW, NAT, ZH, OTHU, and FOU) have a statisti-
cally significant relationship to Q. From the 4 business experience variables, 2 attributes
(INTL and INDKN) are significantly related to Q. However, such regressions have seri-
ous omitted variable biases. Hence, in Column II the same relationship is measured, but
11
Table III: This table reports the absolute number of director characteristic observations. The table dis-
tinguishes between directorships and individual directors. Occ. Rate is the occupancy rate defined as the
ratio of the number of directors to the number of seats. 1,574 directorships are held by 1,349 individuals
in 224 firms.
Panel A: Directorships and Number of Directors
Number of directorships 1,574
Directors with 5 directorships 2
Directors with 4 directorships 9
Directors with 3 directorships 32
Directors with 2 directorships 126
Directors with 1 directorship 1,180
Number of directors 1,349
Panel B: Director Characteristics
Seats Directors Occ. Rate
Total 1,574 1,349 116.68%
Education: Degree
Professor title (Prof.) 92 76 121.05%
Doctorate (Dr. / Ph.D.) 518 418 123.92%
Master of Business Administration (MBA) 219 182 120.33%
University 1,197 1,015 117.93%
University of Applied Sciences and equivalent 72 64 112.50%
Education: Field of Study
Economics 464 393 118.07%
Law 327 260 125.77%
Natural sciences 150 133 112.78%
Technical sciences 233 196 118.88%
Education: University
Basel 85 65 130.77%
Berne 49 38 128.95%
ETH Zurich 196 154 127.27%
Geneva 40 32 125.00%
St. Gallen 152 119 127.73%
Zurich 150 105 142.86%
Other Swiss university 101 91 110.99%
Foreign university 333 314 106.05%
Business Experience
International experience 756 672 112.50%
CEO experience 767 636 120.60%
Financial know-how 950 804 118.16%
Industrial know-how 840 725 115.86%
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this time including industry fixed effects. Here, only the fraction of directors educated
at one of the other Swiss university (OTHU) is still negatively related to Tobin’s Q, and
only the fraction of directors educated abroad (FOU) is still positively related to it. Fur-
thermore, the table shows that standard errors are stable across the models, indicating
that there is no problem of multicollinearity with industry effects.
In general, the reason for these low relationships is not surprising. For instance,
in the case of natural scientists (NAT), it is quite obvious that they are unlikely to be
equally valuable across all industries and that the relationship loses its significance
when industry affiliation is included. In the words of Hermalin and Weisbach (2003),
boards are, on average, mostly in equilibrium. The average board cannot be improved
with a change in its composition, because it is already adequately structured.
Table IV: This table presents (only significant) univariate regression coefficient estimates of the associ-
ation of Tobin’s Q (the response variable) and an explanatory variable. The sample consists of 197 SPI
firm observations in 2008. The coefficients are estimated using OLS estimates with White (1980) robust
standard errors. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent,
and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. R2 is also reported.
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q
Variable Industries excluded Industries included
(I) R2 (II) R2
MBA 1.2774** 0.0280 0.5160 0.2996
(0.640) (0.617)
ECO -0.7390** 0.0175 -0.5192 0.3036
(0.349) (0.345)
LAW -1.3892*** 0.0340 -0.5180 0.2996
(0.458) (0.486)
NAT 2.7003*** 0.1517 1.0870 0.3111
(0.856) (0.998)
ZH -0.8640** 0.0099 -0.3849 0.2974
(0.428) (0.497)
OTHU -1.3220** 0.0202 -1.2038* 0.3114
(0.434) (0.471)
FOU 1.3564*** 0.0705 0.7390** 0.3138
(0.394) (0.366)
INTL 0.9341*** 0.0573 0.4440 0.3061
(0.265) (0.274)
INDKN 1.2170*** 0.0752 0.3755 0.3011
(0.311) (0.282)
3.2 Multivariate Analysis
3.2.1 Correlation Matrix
Table V displays the Pearson’s correlation matrix of relevant variables. The correlations
document how boards trade-off different capabilities. Note that the variables are board
averages. This explains correlations between different education variables. Firstly, no
variables depict a high correlation of over 0.7 that — as a rule of thumb — usually would
13
lead to a multicollinearity problem when the two variables are included in the same
model. The variance inflation factors (VIF) confirm this finding (except for the industry
dummies which, however, are not interpreted individually). However, financial know-
how (FKN) is correlated (0.6) with directors who have studied economics (ECO), as can
be expected because of the definition of financial know-how. Law graduates (LAW) are
negatively related to industrial knowledge (INDKN), underlining their support function
on a board, while technical (TEC) and natural scientists (NAT) are positively related to
industrial know-how. Internationally experienced directors (INTL) are positively corre-
lated with the number of geographical segments (REGIONS).
3.2.2 Analysis on Education
The first set of multivariate models regresses Tobin’s Q on variables of education. Columns
I and II in Table VI employ the field of study, Columns III and IV the academic degree,
and Columns V and VI use the place of education as independent variables. Each of these
sets compares the educational variables alone first, and in a second step in addition to
the control variables. The results indicate that most of the significant relations disap-
pear if control variables are included. The educational variables that have the greatest
explanatory power are related to the field of study (R2=17.08 percent). The only signif-
icant relationship that persists is the negative one between education at another Swiss
university (OTHU) and Tobin’s Q. This relationship disappears if a dummy variable, as
control variable for the French-speaking area, is included where most of these minor
universities are based (not presented). However, as the variables OTHU and FRA are
nearly interchangeable, but not collinearly related, we believe that the education of the
directors is a more important determinant of Tobin’s Q than the location of the firm.
The possible reason for these weak relations, once more, is that boards are composed
up to their needs. For example, the positive relationship between natural scientists
(NAT) and Tobin’s Q vanishes if the regression model is run on a subsample of health
care firms or if only the affiliation to the health care industry is held constant (not pre-
sented). Another example is the positive relation between the fraction of graduates of
universities abroad (FOU) and Tobin’s Q, as well as the number of geographical seg-
ments (REGIONS) (t-statistics: 3.5135 (***)). REGIONS, in turn, is positively related to
Tobin’s Q (t-statistics: 1.9156 (*)), and when controlled for this circumstance, the vari-
able FOU loses its significance. When specifying definitions tightly (e.g., law graduates
from the University of Zurich) no significance was evident at all (not presented).
3.2.3 Analysis on Business Experience
The second set of variables relates to business experience. The 4 business experience
variables already explain 12.23 percent of the variation in Tobin’s Q (R2) (Table VII,
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Column I). International experience (INTL) and industrial knowledge (INDKN) are pos-
itively related to Q while financial know-how (FKN) shows a negative relationship. These
relationships remain unchanged if board experience (EXEC and BTEN) and factors in
the operating environment (ln(SALES), NDIV, DIVISIONS, and REGIONS) are included
(Columns II and III). However, industry fixed effects make these relationships disappear
again (Column IV).
In the last Column (V), we include interaction terms with DIVISIONS and REGIONS
interplaying with business experience.13 International experience is expected to be valu-
able if the firm has sales around the world, and CEO experience can add value if the firm
is developing in various regions. So, the interaction terms include REGIONS with INTL
and CEOEX. In addition, the variable DIVISIONS interacts with financial know-how
(FKN) and industrial know-how (INDKN). Financial know-how is important if the firm
has a corporate center with a treasury. This is usually the case if a company has more
than one division. In contrast, industrial know-how is more valuable if the firm operates
in only few business segments. The results indicate that industrial knowledge is indeed
negatively related to Q if it is interacted with the number of divisions.
3.3 Analysis of Indices
Debates criticizing boards for being overly homogeneous in appealing to a strict sense
of diversity ignore the fact that many directors can be linked together through alumni
associations or other groups and may therefore also lack independence (see Schletti,
2006). This perspective is especially critical in a small country such as Switzerland
where many managers and directors are graduates of the same university. On the one
hand, it is very important that the linkages among board members are not too strong in
order to prevent collusion and to promote opinion-building. On the other hand, mutual
respect may be beneficial in tense situations.
In order to investigate the possible influence of educational diversity, we employ two
series of concentration indices: the Herfindahl-Hirschman and the Shannon indices (see
Appendix Section .1). Both indices measure the concentration in the "field of study"
(HHIEDU and SHIEDU) and "place of education" (HHIUNI and SHIUNI). Table VIII
reveals that no index relating to educational diversity on the board is close to being
significantly related to firm performance. Hence, personal affiliations between board
members owing to a joint education is not relevant to valuation.
13In order to circumvent multicollinearity problems with the interaction terms, the variables in the
interaction terms have been centered. In other words, the sample average values of the variables have
been subtracted from the values of the variables for each observation.
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Table VIII: The table presents regression coefficient estimates of the association of Q with different con-
centration indices. The sample consists of 197 SPI firm observations in 2008. The coefficients are esti-
mated using OLS estimates with White (1980) robust standard errors. The dependent variable is Tobin’s
Q (market value of equity and book value of debt over total assets). HHIEDU is the Herfindahl index of
the field of study; SHIEDU is the Shannon index of the field of study. HHIUNI is the Herfindahl index
of the attended university; SHIUNI is the Shannon index of the attended university. The models include
the following control variables: ln(SALES) is the natural logarithm of net sales; NDIV is 1 if the company
did not pay out dividends in 2007; DIVISIONS is the number of business segments and REGIONS is the
number of geographical segments; INDUSTRY are two-digit ICB industry dummy variables. In addition,
the intercept is dropped to save space. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at the
1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
HHIEDU -0.07066
(0.651)
SHIEDU -0.18510
(0.307)
HHIUNI -0.10025
(0.484)
SHIUNI -0.13846
(0.194)
Control Variables included included included included
Multiple R2 0.29700 0.29880 0.29710 0.29920
Adjusted R2 0.22150 0.22360 0.22160 0.22390
F-test 3.93500 (***) 3.97000 (***) 3.93700 (***) 3.97700 (***)
3.4 Analysis at the Level of Individual Directors
All the precedent models employed aggregated values at the board level. In the next
step, therefore, we use data at the level of individual directors which contains 1,574 ob-
servations. This sample allows us to examine interactions between the educational and
professional backgrounds of directors and two broad demographic classifications of direc-
tors, namely gender and nationality. The fraction of females on the board is denoted GEN
and the fraction of foreigners is FOR. Table IX, Column I, displays results of estimates
using this data sample. Graduates of natural science (NAT) as well as directors with in-
ternational (INTL) and industrial experience (INDKN) are positively related to Tobin’s
Q. CEO experience (CEOEX) and firm performance are negatively correlated. These
main results remain stable after including interactions. However, when taking industry-
effects into account, all but the positive relationship between international experience
and firm performance vanish. Conversely, foreign directors with CEO experience nega-
tively affect the valuation. Such directors may be appointed on boards solely for their
fame or may be too busy to mind their duties. The opposite is true for CEO experienced
females and women graduates of business and economics. Finally, females with financial
know-how are negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q. Quite obviously, having international
experience seems to be more important than simply being a foreigner.
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Table IX: The table presents regression coefficient estimates of the association of Q and individual director
characteristics. The sample consists of 1,574 director observations in 2008. The coefficients are estimated
using OLS estimates with White (1980) robust standard errors. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q
(market value of equity and book value of debt over total assets). The independent variables are dummy
variables for characteristics at the level of individual directors and include the following attributes: FOR
are foreigners; GEN are women; ECO are business and economics graduates; LAW are law graduates; NAT
are natural sciences graduates; TEC are technical sciences graduates; INTL is international experience;
CEOEX is experience as CEO; FKN is financial know-how; INDKN is industrial experience. INDUSTRY
are two-digit ICB industry dummy variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q
variables (I) (II) (III)
(Intercept) 1.51152 (***) 1.43865 (***) 1.06522 (***)
(0.087) (0.097) (0.172)
FOR 0.27745 (**) 0.21407 0.21269
(0.139) (0.495) (0.334)
GEN -0.09087 0.09743 0.23509
(0.147) (0.252) (0.223)
ECO 0.04086 -0.05213 -0.07966
(0.118) (0.090) (0.087)
LAW -0.03947 0.06341 -0.02769
(0.097) (0.107) (0.104)
NAT 0.55685 (***) 0.85674 (***) 0.26638
(0.168) (0.216) (0.185)
TEC -0.07573 0.02825 -0.06603
(0.090) (0.096) (0.087)
INTL 0.32068 (***) 0.34805 (***) 0.19650 (**)
(0.088) (0.091) (0.086)
CEOEX -0.23062 (***) -0.13698 (*) -0.04365
(0.088) (0.077) (0.072)
FKN -0.06537 -0.05450 -0.04419
(0.085) (0.089) (0.084)
INDKN 0.33967 (***) 0.28655 (***) 0.06572
(0.083) (0.071) (0.066)
FOR × ECO 0.20185 0.25372
(0.344) (0.742)
FOR × LAW -0.43060 -0.23820
(0.324) (0.287)
FOR × NAT -0.81838 (**) -0.46335
(0.358) (0.313)
FOR × TEC -0.36182 -0.21896
-(1.541) (0.208)
FOR × INTL 0.27433 -0.09934
(0.483) (0.300)
FOR × CEOEX -0.44157 (*) -0.43482 (*)
(0.262) (0.248)
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Individual-level – continued
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q
variables (I) (II) (III)
FOR × FKN 0.06550 0.19385
(0.258) (0.245)
FOR × INDKN 0.15480 0.33779
(0.253) (0.243)
GEN × ECO 0.90415 (**) 0.70591 (*)
(0.450) (0.416)
GEN × LAW -0.31832 -0.05630
(0.252) (0.234)
GEN × NAT 1.64398 1.32077
(1.111) (0.973)
GEN × TEC -0.37824 0.21617
(0.344) (0.314)
GEN × INTL -0.64753 (*) -0.44248
(0.347) (0.326)
GEN × CEOEX 1.03597 (***) 0.65479 (*)
(0.364) (0.348)
GEN × FKN -0.96827 (**) -0.97100 (**)
(0.440) (0.402)
GEN × INDKN -0.23626 -0.32270
(0.360) (0.352)
INDUSTRY excluded excluded included
Multiple R2 0.06311 0.08311 0.18630
Adjusted R2 0.05712 0.06770 0.16340
F-test 10.53000 (***) 5.39300 (***) 8.14400 (***)
3.5 Fixed Effects Analysis
The preceding regressions used data at the level of individual directors which contained
1,574 observations. Director characteristics have thus been tackled more precisely, but
the omitted-variable bias continues to present a problem. Directors can still differ signif-
icantly in personal characteristics (e.g., talent) other than the variables defined. Hence,
we employ director fixed effects, using the fact that some directors appear more than
once in the sample (see Adams and Ferreira, 2008).
1,574 seats are shared by 1,349 directors (see Table III). This fact allows us to test
for fixed effects. Specifically, we attribute a unique dummy variable to each director who
serves on more than one board. This methodology captures unobservable director-level
heterogeneity for those directors and facilitates an investigation of whether unexplained
or unobserved features drive firm valuation. One property of fixed effects is that they ex-
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plain only invariant omitted variables. Thus, director characteristics that do not change
between boards such as education or financial knowledge are fixed.14 In contrast, other
features such as independence with regard to the management of the corporation or in-
dustry knowledge are not fixed and do change from one board to another. For this reason,
our models consider industry know-how of the directors (INDKN), executive directors
(EXEC), former directors (FEXEC), and directors with business relationships (BREL).
Since we use cross-sectional (and not panel) data, the fact that directors may gain in
experience or education over a long time horizon does not present a problem.
Table X: The table presents regression coefficient estimates of the association of Q and individual director
characteristics. The sample consists of 1,574 director observations in 2008. The coefficients are estimated
using OLS estimates with White (1980) robust standard errors. Column III shows coefficient estimates
including director fixed effects. The dependent variable Q denotes Tobin’s Q (market value of equity and
book value of debt over total assets); The independent variables are dummy variables for characteristics
at the level of individual directors and include the following attributes: INDKN is industrial know-how;
EXEC are insiders (executive directors); FEXEC are former insiders; BREL are directors with business
relations to the firm; INDUSTRY are two-digit ICB industry dummy variables. Director Fixed Effects
are dummy variables for every director who holds more than one seat in the sample. The table shows
estimates, standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and
10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q
Variables (I) (II) (III)
(Intercept) 1.52202 (***) 1.12125 (***) 1.16162 (***)
(0.040) (0.107) (0.135)
INDKN 0.38324 (***) 0.10992 0.13153 (*)
(0.076) (0.069) (0.072)
EXEC 0.65834 (***) 0.55364 (**) 0.57608 (**)
(0.226) (0.217) (0.228)
FEXEC -0.11003 -0.00712 -0.02175
(0.126) (0.109) (0.120)
BREL 0.27376 (*) 0.13780 0.17896
(0.157) (0.145) (0.154)
INDUSTRY excluded included included
Director Fixed Effects excluded excluded included
Multiple R2 0.03677 0.16970 0.22030
Adjusted R2 0.03431 0.15850 0.11320
F-test 14.97000 (***) 15.10000 (***) 2.05700 (***)
Wald-test: Column II v. Column III: 8.54380 (***)
Table X, Column I, confirms the results from Table IX (Columns I and II) that in-
dustrial knowledge (INDKN) is significantly positively related to firm performance. The
same relationship appears for executive directors (EXEC) and directors with business
14The same is true for firm fixed effects which are often used in studies with panel data. Such firm effects
are especially powerful if firm characteristics are time-invariant (or stationary) (e.g., industry affiliation).
In contrast, firm characteristics that change such as sales growth are omitted. Bertrand and Schoar
(2003) track managers over time and across companies. Hence, in contrast to directors, managers usually
only serve for one firm at one and the same time. The empirical evidence shows that firm policies and
performance highly depend on managerial fixed effects. Fixed effects account for unobserved heterogeneity
among top managers.
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relations (BREL). The inclusion of industry effects in Column II leaves only insiders
(EXEC) as a significant factor.
Finally, in Column III, the director fixed effects are included. The higher intercept
in Column III compared to Column II suggests that the average valuation of multiple
directorships is lower than for directors holding only one seat. Furthermore, the inte-
gration of such fixed effects increases R2 from 16.97 percent to 22.03 percent. In other
words, unobserved characteristics of directors appearing more than once in the sample
explain only 5 percent of Tobin’s Q and adding variables to a model always increases
R2. In fact, adjusted R2 actually decreases by about 5 percent. Nevertheless, the Wald-
test, a heteroskedasticity-robust F-test, provides evidence that these effects significantly
improve the model at a 1 percent level of significance.
4 Conclusions
Directors have various characteristics that are difficult to proxy. Most studies relating
the board to firm performance use simple classifications (e.g., board independence or
demography). This study uses a host of variables describing the educational and profes-
sional experience of directors.
First of all, the study indicates that firms compose their boards (partly) according to
their needs. Natural scientists are common in health care firms, while there is an above
average prevalence of economists in banks. The results show that while in univariate
analysis there are significant relationships between these variables and Tobin’s Q (e.g,
a negative relation between lawyers and Q), these associations almost all vanish if con-
trol variables are included (especially industry effects). A persisting and significantly
negative relation exists between education at Swiss universities other than those explic-
itly defined in our study and Tobin’s Q. In addition, industrial know-how is significantly
negatively related to Tobin’s Q interacting with the number of divisions: industrial know-
how is not valuable if the number of business segments is high.
This suggests that, in general, boards are in equilibrium. There is no specific board
composition (e.g., a high fraction of economists) that, on average, can enhance firm value.
In contrast, lasting relationships, i.e., significant relationships that remain after the in-
clusion of control variables, suggest that some boards are out of equilibrium. In other
words, Tobin’s Q could be improved on average if boards were to employ a specific per-
centage of, say, economists. This is not true in most cases.
Secondly, models that use data at the level of individual directors show that interna-
tional experience impacts firm valuation while the simple fact of being a foreigner does
not — or even lowers firm value in case of foreigners with CEO experience. In addition,
females are positively related to Tobin’s Q if they are economists and have CEO experi-
ence, but there is a negative relationship between financially literate women and firm
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performance.
Thirdly, directors have other unobservable features (e.g., talent) that are usually ab-
sorbed in the error term. This heterogeneity may explain missing links between directors
and firm performance. If good proxies are unavailable, it is possible to use fixed effects in
the case of panel data or, as in our case, cross-sectional data that indicates the presence
of directors on more than one board. The results show that director fixed effects improve
the explanatory power of the model significantly, but by only around 5 percent (adding
variables always increases R2). In other words, all characteristics that are not observed,
such as talent, do only slightly improve the model.
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.1 Indices
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index
The first concentration index is labeled Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (or Simpson, Blau,
or Gibbs-Martin Index). This index is calculated as follows (p is the fraction of directors
in the i-th group of a specific category (e.g., economists)):
HHI =
N∑
i=1
p2i
An index value of 1 implies that the board consists of one group with equal director’s
characteristics. The lower the value, the less homogeneous the board is.
Shannon Index
The second concentration index is labeled Shannon Index (or Entropy or Teachman In-
dex): This index is calculated as follows (p is the fraction of directors in the i-th group of
a specific category (e.g., economists)):
SHI =−
N∑
i=1
pi× ln(pi)
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